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Kotler: Shared Sovereign Immunity as an Alternative to Federal Preemption

SHARED SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO FEDERAL PREEMPTION:
AN ESSAY ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HARM TO OTHERS
MartinA. Kotler*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1992, the Supreme Court handed down a plurality decision in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.1 That decision, together with a series of
subsequent cases dealing with the federal preemption of state tort law, 2
served to reverse a long-standing judicial approach to federal preemption
under which claims of express preemption had been summarily
rejected.3 These more recent decisions have been criticized by many and,
in fact, have been characterized by myself and others as examples of
pro-business judicial activism seeking to impose tort reform from the
bench.4 Yet, for all that is objectionable about the Court's approach in
these cases, often there is also something intuitively appealing about the
results attained.

*

Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law.

1. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
2. E.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC,
544 U.S. 431 (2005); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'
Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000);
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995);
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993), superseded by statute, Federal Railroad
Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 110-448 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (2008)).
3. See MARTIN A. KOTLER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND BASIC TORT LAW § 5.8.2.1, at 249-51
(2005); DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 14.4, at 901-03 (2005).

4. See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court Tort Reform: Limiting State Power
to Articulate and Develop Tort Law--Defamation, Preemption, and Punitive Damages, 74 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1189, 1223-43 (2006); Martin A. Kotler, The Myth of Individualism and the Appeal of Tort
Reform, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 779, 826-29 (2007); Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort
Law in America: The Counter-Revolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 647,691-92 (2008).
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This Article will argue that, notwithstanding numerous judicial
assertions to the contrary, the results reached in many of these cases
have little, if anything, to do with congressional intent. Instead, the
decisions are better understood in terms of implied immunity or shared
sovereign immunity and represent a strikingly clear application of a
long-standing principle of tort law-a principle that insists that
responsibility for harm will not be attributed to an individual where the
individual's ability to have chosen an alternative course of action was
impaired by another who was in a position of authority and thus able to
dictate conduct. In other words, where one could not have acted
otherwise without risking legal sanction, tort law may not be used to
penalize the compliant conduct.
The importance of the underlying principle is readily apparent in
other areas of tort law as well. The Products Liability Restatement's
insistence on the availability of a "reasonable alternative design" as the
primary test of defectiveness in (non-drug) product design cases 6 is one
obvious example,
but there are also many other less obvious applications
7
of the principle.
At this point, it should probably be noted that the underlying
premise that tort liability is commonly viewed as a form of punishment
or at least attribution of responsibility for wrongdoing is nothing new,
although the apparently casual implicit acceptance of this notion by the
United States Supreme Court, the federal judiciary, and many state
courts is somewhat surprising given that courts and legal scholars have
long denied tort law's punitive role. 8 In contrast, social scientistsprimarily psychologists and sociologists-have recognized the obvious
parallel between tort and crime and dealt with both as variations on the
same assignment of responsibility theme, pretty much as a matter of
self-evident truth. 9
Using Cipollone as a starting point, Part II of this Article will
review the decision, note the essential problem, and briefly sketch the
reason for the attractiveness of the outcome. Part III takes up the social
5. See infra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
6.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2, at 19 (1998).

7. See infra text accompanying notes 63-76, 89-92, 106-08.
8. With the exception of punitive damages, of course.
9. See, e.g., Robert F. Kidd & Mary K. Utne, Reactions to Inequity: A Prospective on the
Role of Attributions, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 301, 304 (1978) (noting equity theorists' application of

their model to tort and criminal law and citing examples); see also Jeannine A. Gailey & Matthew
T. Lee, An IntegratedModel of Attribution of Responsibility for Wrongdoing in Organizations,68

SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 338, 340 (2005) (explaining the application of their model to tort, crime, and
informal social sanction, and distinguishing them on the basis of a "burden-of -proof continuum").
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science attribution literature both as background and to explain why
coercion or duress plays such a key role in tort law and forms the pivotal
issue in the preemption cases. Part IV illustrates just how the coercion
argument has been applied, particularly when the government is the
source of coercion, while Part V uses it to lay out an alternative and
more coherent approach to those products liability cases presently being
decided under the fiction of congressional intent.

II. THE MODEL CASE-CIPOLLONE
Ignoring, for the moment, how the case could (and should) have
been decided, it is useful to examine the approach taken by the Court in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.'0 The underlying products liability
lawsuit was brought by a smoker of cigarettes marketed by the
defendants. Among the many counts, the plaintiff alleged that the
cigarettes were defective because of the defendants' failure to warn
"about the hazards of smoking."" Of course, in fact the cigarettes did
carry a warning. As required by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act of 196512 (the "Act") and the 1969 amendment to the
Act, 13 cigarettes marketed between 1966 and 1969 warned that smoking
"May Be Hazardous to Your Health,' 4 while those marketed in
conformity to the 1969 amendment warned that cigarette smoking "Is
Dangerous."' 5 These warnings, however, were alleged to have been
inadequate.' 6 In response, the defendants pled that the suit was
preempted by federal law.'7
Thus, the decision of the case was made to turn on whether and to
what extent Congress intended to preclude state common-law tort
litigation when it enacted the Act. Responding to that issue, the Court
focused on the preemption language of the statute.' 8 The Act provided:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the
statement required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on
any cigarette package.
10. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
11. Id.at 508 (plurality opinion).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (1965) (effective Jan. 1, 1966).
13. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (1969) (amending 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (1965)).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1965).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1969) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1965)).
16. 505 U.S. at 509 (plurality opinion).
17. Id.at 510.
18. Id. at 514-15 (quoting the language of the Act and the 1969 amendment).
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(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the packages of
19 which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this chapter.
When the Act was amended in 1969, the language was changed
somewhat to read:
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall
be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or
promotion of any cigarettes the packages of
which are labeled in
2
conformity with the provisions of this chapter. 0
Analyzing the original language of the Act, a plurality of the Court
concluded that it was not intended to preempt state lawsuits, but "merely
prohibited state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating
particular cautionary statements on cigarette labels ' 21 and the simple fact
that "Congress requires a particular warning label does not automatically
pre-empt a regulatory field., 22 In other words, the restriction applied
only to state legislatures and regulatory bodies, not to courts.23 The 1969
amendment's language of no .'requirement[] or prohibition[]," on the
other hand, was viewed as "much broader,, 24 prohibiting not only
positive enactments by the states, but certain state common-law lawsuits
as well.25 Counts that were based, not on the mandated warning, but on
other conduct not compelled by the statute-the creation and subsequent
breach of express warranty and fraudulent misrepresentation, for
26
example-were allowed to proceed.
The Court stressed that, because the preemption doctrine rests
entirely upon congressional intent, the presence of an express
preemption provision precluded the possibility of finding implied
preemption-either on the basis of conflicts between state and federal
law or on the basis of a congressional intent to occupy the field. The
Court stated:
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has
included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing
that issue, and when that provision provides a "reliable indicium of

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

15 U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b) (1965) (amended 1969).
15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1969) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1965)).
505 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id. at 518-19.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 523-29.
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congressional intent with respect to state authority," "there is no need
to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the
substantive provisions" of the legislation. Such reasoning is a variant
of the familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius:
Congress' enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach
27 of a
statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.
There were at least two major problems with the decision, however.
First, the Court was attempting to get an awful lot of interpretive
mileage out of what appears to be a very minor alteration in the language
of the 1965 preemption provision. Certainly the change from "[n]o
statement relating to smoking and health shall be required" to "[n]o
requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law" is not self-evidently reflective of a
congressional intent to broaden the scope of preemption to encompass
state common-law tort suits. In fact, when the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals considered that precise issue, it had concluded that no
significant change had been intended 28 and the parties themselves took
the position "that the 1969 Act did not materially alter the pre-emptive
scope of federal law." 29 Second, if the issue is one of legislative intent,
as it necessarily must be under the Court's analysis, there is virtually no
extrinsic evidence that supports the conclusion that Congress somehow
had such a result in its collective mind when it enacted the law. In fact,
the legislative history of the Act and the state of preemption
jurisprudence at the time that the 1969 amendment was enacted makes it
difficult to believe that the preemptive interpretation given by the Court
was congressionally foreseen, let alone intended.30
27. Id. at 517 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978); Cal. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987)).
28. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 505 U.S. 504
(1992).
29. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520 (plurality opinion).
30. See Cipollone,789 F.2d at 185-86.
Because we are constrained by the presumption against preemption, we cannot say that
the language of section 1334 clearly encompasses state common law. We find support
for this determination in Congress's failure to include state common law explicitly
within section 1334, as it has in numerous other statutes. Indeed, in the absence of a
preemption provision encompassing state common law, the Supreme Court has relied
generally on principles of implied preemption in evaluating whether a statutory scheme
preempts state common law.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Lee Gordon Dunst, Federal Preemption: The Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act and Tort Claims Challenging the Adequacy of Cigarette Warnings,
1990 ANN. SURV. Am. L. 459, 464-66 (1991).
The legislative history of the Cigarette Act and the subsequent amending legislation,
however, discuss this preemption provision in terms of state and local regulations.
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On the other hand, the idea that it would have been grossly unfair to
have held the manufacturers civilly liable for having not placed a
stronger, more explicit warning on the cigarette packages or in their
advertising when they were expressly prohibited from doing so by the
congressional mandate of the Act has a distinct intuitive appeal, and this
is particularly so if the imposition of tort liability is seen as punishment
for wrongdoing. After all, if the defendants are being blamed for having
inflicted harm (and ultimately death),31 it seems entirely appropriate for
them to object on the basis that they had no choice-the precise
language of the warning was dictated by the legislation and the
defendants were compelled to abide by the statutory command.
Of course, punishment or even attribution of responsibility has not
always been viewed as a necessary or even proper function of tort law.
Only a few decades ago, during the height of judicial acceptance of strict
liability theory, the imposition of tort liability was widely regarded as
non-punitive-requiring the payment of compensation simply served to
increase the cost of doing business in order to accomplish various
instrumentalist goals. Thus, for example, in Ferebee v. Chevron
Chemical Co.,32 the court rejected the defendant's federal preemption

argument, explaining:
In this case, a Maryland jury found that the [Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA")] approved label did not sufficiently guard against
certain injuries. Even if Chevron could not alter the label, Maryland
could decide that, as between a manufacturer and an injured party, the
manufacturer ought to bear the cost of compensating for those injuries
that could have been prevented with a more detailed label than that
approved by the EPA. That is, Maryland can be conceived of as having
decided that, if it must abide by EPA's determination that a label is
adequate, Maryland will nonetheless require manufacturers to bear the
risk of any injuries that could have been prevented had Maryland been
allowed to require a more detailed label or had Chevron persuaded
Congress was silent on the question of whether section 1334 was intended to extend to
state tort law. Accordingly, the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
preempt state and local regulation, but provides no dispositive evidence as to whether
Congress intended its labeling scheme to preempt state tort liability. Several
Congressmen thought that consumers would still be able to bring tort actions against the
tobacco companies in the aftermath of the Cigarette Act. However, these few statements
do not provide enough evidence from which to infer congressional intent.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
31. Mrs. Cipollone filed the original lawsuit in 1983. She died from lung cancer in 1984 and
her husband then filed an amended complaint shortly before his own death. Cipollone, 504 U.S. at
509 (plurality opinion).
32. 736 F.2d 1529, 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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EPA that a more comprehensive label was needed. The verdict itself
does not command Chevron to alter its label-the verdict merely tells
Chevron that, if it chooses to continue selling paraquat in Maryland, it
may have to compensate for some of the resulting injuries. That may in
some sense impose a burden on the sale of paraquat in Maryland, but it
is not equivalent to a direct regulatory command that Chevron change
its label. Chevron can comply with both federal and state law by
continuing to use the EPA-approved label and by simultaneously
33
paying damages to successful tort plaintiffs such as Mr. Ferebee.
With the widespread rejection of strict liability theory in more
recent years, however, courts have come to view the imposition of tort
liability as punitive, thus squarely raising the fairness issues that, though
dismissed in earlier times, appear critical in understanding the decision
in Cipollone and the subsequent preemption cases.
III.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCE "ATTRIBUTION" LITERATURE

To understand the importance of the view that tort law is viewed as
punitive, it is useful to briefly review some of the social science
"attribution" literature. For the past fifty years or so, psychologists and,
to a somewhat lesser extent, sociologists and anthropologists, have
sought to identify those factors deemed important in the decision to
attribute responsibility or blame to an individual who has caused another
to suffer some loss or injury. 34 While the relative importance of the
factors, the order in which children integrate each into their framework
for moral decisionmaking, and the empirical methodology used to test
for the factors' existence and relative importance remain open to debate,
something approaching consensus exists as to the identification of the
requisite factors themselves. Thus, for example, it is generally agreed
that the existence of a causal connection between one person's act and
another's harm is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a judgment
33. Id. at 1541; see also Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 248 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(reasoning that state tort law supplemented federal regulation of vaccines since "the specter of
damage actions may provide manufacturers with added dynamic incentives to continue to keep
abreast of all possible injuries stemming from use of their product so as to forestall such actions
through product improvement." (quoting Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1541-42)).
34. See John M. Darley & Thomas R. Shultz, MoralRules: Their Content and Acquisition, 41
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 525, 526-32, 538 (1990) (reviewing the literature from 1932 to 1990); see
also JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 100-01, 109-12 (Maijorie Gabain trans.,
1965) (discussing children's acquisition of moral values). The origin of the modem field of
attribution of responsibility for harm, however, is usually credited to Heider. See FRITZ HEIDER,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 15-17 (1958) (discussing the factors of the mind

that are attributed to a person's perception of harmful acts).
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that blame is to be attributed.35 In fact, studies involving children
provide evidence that by age five children know "that judgments of
punishment presuppose[] judgments of moral responsibility36 and that
moral responsibility judgments presuppose causal judgments."
When coupled with causation, the actor's intention, in the sense of
acting for the purpose of bringing about a specific consequence, is
generally agreed to be sufficient,37 although studies often reveal the
existence of the familiar legal problem of determining or agreeing upon
what counts as a relevant consequence.38 Thus, although the modem
American view of battery as an intentional tort 39 (distinct from the older
English view of trespass as requiring intentional or unintentional direct
touching of another) 40 is more than a hundred years old, courts continue
to disagree whether the defendant need only act for the purpose of
touching or must act for the purpose of harmfully or offensively
touching. 4 1 In the absence of intent (however defined), negligence or
on the extent to which
recklessness, characterizations that are dependent
43
42
harm was foreseeable or foreseen, will suffice.
35. See Thomas R. Shultz et al., Assignment of Moral Responsibility and Punishment, 57
CHILDDEV. 177, 177 (1986).
[Aln initial perception of harm doing is followed by a decision about how the harm was
caused. If a particular person's actions are seen as not constituting a necessary condition
for the harm, that actor is judged not to have caused the harm, and the judgment process
is terminated for that actor, who is held neither morally responsible nor punishable. In
contrast, if a particular person's action is viewed as a necessary condition for the harm,
that actor is considered to have caused the harm and the process continues to a decision
concerning the actor's moral responsibility.
Id. (citation omitted).
36. Darley & Shultz, supra note 34, at 535.
37. Id. at 533-36.
38. See, e.g., Royal Grueneich, Issues in the Developmental Study of How Children Use
Intention and Consequence Information to Make Moral Evaluations, 53 CHILD DEV. 29, 31 (1982)
(discussing unintended consequences of intended behavior).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965) (defining harmful battery and
offensive battery, respectively).
40. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 6, at 29-30

(5th ed. 1984) (noting "[tihere is still some occasional confusion, and some talk of a negligent
'assault and battery,' but in general these terms are restricted to cases of intent" (footnotes
omitted)).
41. Compare White v. Univ. of Idaho, 797 P.2d 108, 109 (Idaho 1990) ("[The Court of
Appeals concluded that Professor Neher did in fact commit a battery, reasoning that under Idaho
law the intent required for the commission of a battery is simply the intent to cause an unpermitted
contact not an intent that the contact be harmful or offensive. We agree .... ), with White v.
Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 818 (Colo. 2000) (holding that "the law of Colorado requires the jury to
conclude that the defendant both intended the contact and intended it to be harmful or offensive").
42. Although there is no disagreement on the point that "negligence" requires reasonably
foreseeable harm, there is considerable disagreement on the proper definition of "recklessness."
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500, at 587 ("The actor's conduct is in reckless
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Not surprisingly, the actor's motive-whether one acted
altruistically or to bestow a benefit on oneself in the sense of acting out
of spite or malice, for example-is judged as highly relevant,
particularly by children, 44 but by adults as well. 45 Other underlying
reasons for acting that might be characterized as "motive"-to protect
oneself (self-defense, or private necessity) or to protect others (defense
of others, or public necessity)-are also important, although analytically,
they typically serve as excuses or justifications offered to negate or
ameliorate the blame that might otherwise be attributed.46
There is some disagreement regarding the importance of the extent
of harm. While some older studies seemed to link attribution of blame

disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his
duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable
man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another,
but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent."), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 2, at 18
(Proposed Final Draft 2005) ("A person acts recklessly in engaging in conduct if: (a) the person
knows of the risk of harm created by the conduct or knows facts that make the risk obvious to
another in the person's situation, and (b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk
involves burdens that are so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the person's
failure to adopt the precaution a demonstration of the person's indifference to the risk.").
43. See Shultz et al., supra note 35, at 177 (stating that "if the person's harm-producing action
is deemed either intentional or negligent, the actor is held morally responsible (blameworthy) and
the process continues"); see also Darley & Shultz, supra note 34, at 531-33 (discussing the literature
on intent and foreseeability); J.G. Hook, Heider's ForeseeabilityLevel of Responsibility Attribution:
Does It Come After Intentionality?, 60 CHILD DEV. 1212, 1216 (1989) (arguing that children first
attribute responsibility for intentional harm and only later develop an understanding of
foreseeability).
44. See Tjeert Olthof et al., Personal Responsibility Antecedents of Anger and Blame
Reactions in Children, 60 CHILD DEV. 1328, 1329, 1335 (1989) (noting that earlier studies "show
that motive acceptability influences even 3-year-old children's evaluations, and this criterion
increases in importance up to the age of 8 to 9 years" and concluding from their experiments that
"the presence of bad motives outweighs the perpetrator's lack of intent in causing the harm"
(citation omitted)).
45. See Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Ordinary Man, and the Psychology of Attributing Causes
and Responsibility, 42 MOD. L. REV. 143, 155 (1979) (noting that it has been suggested that the
failure to control for motive may account for inconsistencies in psychological experimentation); see
also Martin A. Kotler, Motivation and Tort Law: Acting for Economic Gain as a Suspect Motive, 41
VAND. L. REv. 63, 68 (1988) (arguing that the perceived motivation of the actors has played an
extensive role in the development of tort doctrine).
46. See Darley & Shultz, supra note 34, at 533-34 ("Excuses are offered when one admits to
having caused harm, but does not accept responsibility for it.... If such an excuse is accepted, the
act was not immoral and the question of blame does not arise. A justification comes into play, on
the other hand, when the actor accepts moral responsibility for the harm but denies that it was a bad
thing to do, thereby avoiding blame .... "). For a discussion on the distinction between justifications
and excuses, see generally Kent Greenawalt, DistinguishingJustificationsfrom Excuses, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1986).
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and severity of injury,47 the methodology by which those conclusions

were generated has been questioned.4 8 Although there does not appear to
have been much research on the subject, 49 one might also hypothesize
that the type of harm might be significant either as a function of
severity-personal injury is more serious and deserving of blame than
property damage-or as a function of foreseeability.
Additionally, volition is certainly a necessary condition, although
the waters are somewhat muddied by the fact that social scientists often
refer to it as "intention., 50 At the very least, however, there does not
appear to be any reason to believe that truly involuntary physical
movements-those which occur while one is asleep or while one is
having a seizure, for example-will trigger blame.5 1
To the foregoing factors, generated primarily by experimental
psychologists, sociologists (most notably Hamilton) have added the
actor's social status and others' expectations regarding his or her
behavior in light of that social status. 52 This additional factor adds
significant complexity to the problem. Not only must one consider what
the actor did and why the actor behaved that way, but one must also
consider who is doing the judging and what his or her perception of the
47. See Charles A. Lowe & Frederic J. Medway, Effects of Valence, Severity, and Relevance
on Responsibility and DispositionalAttribution, 44 J. PERSONALITY 518, 527-29, 533-34 (1976);
Frederic J. Medway & Charles A. Lowe, Effects of Outcome Valence and Severity on Attribution of
Responsibility, 36 PSYCHOL. REP. 239, 243 (1975); see also Darley & Shultz, supra note 34, at 534
(noting additional studies); Richard L. Gorsuch & Craig S. Smith, Attributions of Responsibility to
God: An Interaction of Religious Beliefs and Outcomes, 22 J. Sci. STUD. RELIGION 340, 344-46
(1983) (examining the Lowe-Medway hypothesis in light of subjects' religious convictions); Elaine
Walster, Assignment of Responsibilityfor an Accident, 3 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 73, 7879 (1966) (hypothesizing that people attribute responsibility to others to protect themselves from
having to acknowledge that they might be victims of random events and that this tendency will
increase with severity of harm).
48. See Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 45, at 156 (noting that "Walster's finding has not been
consistently replicated"); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Outcome Severity and Judgments of
"Responsibility": A Meta-Analytic Review, 30 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2575, 2576-77 (2000)
(reporting that subsequent research provided "mixed results" for the Lowe-Medway and Walster
hypotheses).
49. See Grueneich, supra note 38, at 33-34 (noting the lack of research on the importance of
the nature of the consequences and suggesting that its importance may be linked to whether the
outcome was intentionally or accidentally produced).
50. See, e.g., id. at 31 (discussing intentional and unintentional actions).
51. See Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 556, 558 (2000) (explaining that the author's central premise "reflects the assumption that
observers' proclivity to blame... is conflated with their assessments of personal control").
52. See V. Lee Hamilton, Who is Responsible? Toward a Social Psychology of Responsibility
Attribution, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 316, 320-26 (1978); V. Lee Hamilton & Joseph Sanders, The Effect
of Roles and Deeds on Responsibility Judgments: The Normative Structure of Wrongdoing, 44 SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 237, 237-38 (1981).
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conduct, in light of his or her expectations, will be.53 In any case, a
theory of attribution must necessarily account for not only what was
done and why, but by whom and whether it is acceptable or not
according to the person making the judgment attributing blame.54
Nevertheless, the situation is not quite as bad as suggested by the
late Arthur Leff when he characterized the experience of reading some
55
anthropological literature as "falling into a tub of still-warm taffy.,
Although the attribution of responsibility may be dependent on a host of
factors whose relative importance varies with the particular
circumstances surrounding the occurrence and the subsequent
assessment of it, it is commonly accepted that an actor's freedom of
choice is an essential prerequisite. In fact, the foregoing statement is
essentially definitional. Absent the choice to act other than one has,
one's conduct cannot be deemed volitional at all. Thus, consider, for
example, the implications of an extreme version of predestination. If one
is not a free agent, in some sense, responsibility is an impossibility.
Assuming free agency, however, the question of responsibility
becomes meaningful. When the existence of choice becomes
questionable because the actor was responding to duress or coercion, the
nature, extent, and source of the coercive power that is exercised to
compel behavior and the harm-causing individual's response to that
coercion will largely account for the degree to which we will attribute
blame-that is, conclude that the harm-causing actor was a wrongdoer.
In other words, the acceptability of a claim that one was just following
orders depends on who was giving the orders, the relationship between
the coercer and coerced, the perceived consequences of disobedience to

53. Hamilton, supranote 52, at 325-26.
54. Russell Veitch & Anthony Piccione, The Role of Attitude Similarity in the Attribution
Process, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 165, 165-66 (1978) ("[The person attributing responsibility] may
selectively focus on certain aspects of events while ignoring others. This selectivity may be a
function of the observer's identification with the task (e.g., past experience, future expectation, etc.)
or with the actor performing the task. When the behavioral event has 'affective significance' for the
observer (e.g., interpersonal knowledge of the actor), the consequent attributions will be based in
part on the facts of the situation and in part on the nature of the affective significance." (quoting
HEIDER, supra note 34, at 170)). But see Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, Is There a "Common
Law" of Responsibility?: The Effect of Demographic Variables on Judgments of Wrongdoing, 11
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 277, 294 (1987) (finding "substantial consensus in the process of attributing
responsibility" across groups of people with varying demographic characteristics). See also Kidd &
Utne, supra note 9, at 303 (explaining that equity theorists acknowledge "that observers within and
without a... relationship will frequently assess participants' inputs and outcomes differently").
55. Arthur Allen Leff, Commentary, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 473 (1974).
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the actor, and the foreseen or foreseeable consequences to others if the
actor obeys.56
In the context of assigning criminal responsibility, there is a large
body of literature dealing with the legal and moral significance of an
actor having obeyed a command of one in authority. Whether examining
the Nazi atrocities of the 1930s and 1940s or Mai Lai in 1968 or, more
recently, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, the issue of the presence of
coercion, and the existence and extent of personal responsibility in the
face of that coercion, has been a recurring theme. The same issues,
however, albeit in far less dramatic form with fewer and less severe
consequences, permeate the field of civil liability-both in tort and
contract law.
In tort cases, there is significant debate concerning the meaning of
"coercion" (or "duress") and just where it fits into the analysis. 5 7 An
actor who is, in some sense, coerced to act-say, by having a gun put to
his or her head-might claim that conduct made in response to coercion
does not (or should not) count as being an act at all. Under this view, the
actor's volition has been so severely compromised by the presentation of
unacceptable choices that even characterizing the resulting conduct as an
"act" is inappropriate. It is closer to an involuntary muscle spasm. On
the other hand, one might plausibly argue that conduct performed in
compliance to a coercive threat is still an act, but the fact that it was
coerced should be taken into account either to excuse the conduct or to
justify it., 8
For our purposes here, however, the precise characterization is
unimportant as long as it is recognized that one can be confronted with a
set of circumstances that affect choice in such a manner that it would be
deemed unfair to hold the actor responsible for the resulting
consequences. John Lawrence Hill explained:
The traditional theory views coercion as an overcoming of the will of
the victim such that the resulting action is viewed as unfree,
56. See Alicke, supra note 51, at 560-62; Kidd & Utne, supra note 9, at 306. Kidd and Utne,
arguing from the perspective of equity theorists, assert that the feelings of distress are lessened by
the knowledge that one is acting "under some external constraints" and thus "the discomfort from
the injustice and the motivation to reduce the injustice will not be as great when the cause of the
inequity is seen as occurring because of forces acting outside the person rather than forces acting
within the person." Kidd & Utne, supranote 9, at 306.
57. Greenawalt, supra note 46, at 96.
58. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also Alicke, supra note 51, at 557

(explaining that Shaver viewed the existence or lack of acceptable excuses or justifications as the
basis of distinguishing "moral responsibility" and "blame" (citing KELLY G. SHAVER, THE
ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME: CAUSALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND BLAMEWORTHINESS 67 (1985))).
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involuntary, or against one's will. Thus, defenders of the traditional
account tend to conceptualize coercion as a type of excuse, rather than
as a justification, because the underlying rationale for the defense is
that the coerced actor is not responsible for her act....
In contrast to the traditional theory, moralized accounts of coercion
maintain that legal claims predicated upon duress are at least partially a
function of normative judgments about the nature of the situation and
the right of the victim to respond in a certain way. In other words, a
claim of duress is not simply a legal conclusion drawn from empirical
premises concerning the psychological state of the actor-i.e., that the
actor did not act voluntarily-as with the traditional theory. Rather, the
determination that a particular case is coercive may flow from
antecedent moral convictions that the putatively coerced actor
possessed a kind of moral privilege to yield to the threat, or that no
person should have to resist a similar threat. In sum, the defender of a
moralized theory of coercion need not maintain that coerced acts are
qualitatively different, with respect to the standpoint of the
psychological state of the victim of coercion, from uncoerced acts. All
that is absolutely necessary for the moralized account is to maintain
that the victim's predicament is morally different from that of the
uncoerced actor-that it would not be fair to hold the victim of
coercion responsible
for his act irrespective of whether the coerced act
' 59
is "voluntary.
Moreover, in cases where the coercion takes the form of a legal
mandate backed by the sanctioning power of a governmental entity,
penalizing the actor for the consequences that result from compliance
with the statutory, regulatory, or judicial order may also be viewed as
unfair. The legal clichd dusted off for such occasions typically alludes to
the court's unwillingness to see a party placed between Scylla and
Charybdis.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE SCYLLA-CHARYBDIS ARGUMENT
A.

In General

In Greek mythology, Charybdis was a whirlpool-creating sea
monster that inhabited one side of a narrow strait, and Scylla was a sixheaded sea monster that inhabited the other side of the strait. 60 Sailors
seeking to avoid the whirlpools of Charybdis were thus compelled to
59. John Lawrence Hill, Moralized Theories of Coercion:A CriticalAnalysis,74 DENV. U. L.
REv. 907, 908-09 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
60. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 273-74 (Robert Fagles, trans.) (1996).
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come within the reach of (and become a meal for) Scylla.6 1 In other
words, the allusion being employed refers to being placed in the
unenviable situation where one is confronted with two equally bad
choices. Courts have used the allusion to characterize many disparate
types of cases. For example, a California appellate court rejected a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel in a case where unfavorable
testimony was given by a witness who had been called to testify at the
client's insistence, contrary to the attorney's advice. The court noted:
To label defense counsel's conduct in this case "incompetent" is to
take this abused theory into the stratosphere of legal abstraction: it has
never been clearer that the decision under attack was not defense
counsel's. The court, defense counsel, and [the defendant] himself took
pains to memorialize that fact. And claims such as [defendant's] place
defense counsel between Scylla and Charybdis: if counsel had
overruled [defendant's] decision to call [the witness] we would
certainly be faced with the claim that counsel had deprived his client of
an essential defense, since [Defendant] 6had
expected [the witness] to
2
give favorable testimony on entrapment.
The allusion is also sometimes used to characterize a type of
unconscionability, that which exists where a party is offered an
ostensible choice, but under circumstances where one of the choices is
simply not a realistic option-though it would be more accurate to
describe it as a "Hobson's choice., 63 Thus, for example, where a credit
card issuer demanded that an existing customer either agree to the
addition of a mandatory arbitration clause or immediately cancel the
card and pay off the balance, the court refused to enforce the arbitration
clause, noting that "when placed between Scylla and Charybdis, the
practical result is the consumer
has no choice at all and is forced to
'agree' to the modification., 64
More commonly, however, it is used as the basis for the creation of
a common-law immunity from liability where the liability would arise
from the performance of conduct that is mandated by a court order,
61. Id. at 274-75, 278-79; see also WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE 1313 (David B. Guralnik et al. eds., 1968) ("[B]etween Scylla and Charybdis, facing
difficulty or danger on either hand; between two perils or evils, neither of which can be evaded
without risking the other.").
62. People v. Galan, 261 Cal. Rptr. 834, 877 n.3 (Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted).
63. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE, supra note 61,
at 690 ("Hobson's choice, [after Thomas Hobson (d. 1631), of Cambridge, England, who owned

livery stables and let horses in strict order according to their position near the door], a choice of
taking what is offered or nothing at all."); see also infra note 74.
64. Shea v. Household Bank (SB), Nat'l Ass'n., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 2003).
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positive enactment, or government contract. Thus, for example, in
DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,65 a case involving
§ 198366 and Bivens67 claims against a private company that provided
security services for Los Alamos National Laboratory ("LANL") under a
contract with the federal government, 8 the court held that the defendant
possessed a qualified immunity from liability. 69 The court explained:
In the instant case, the private party defendants are not alleged to
have conspired with a government official to act beyond the
boundaries of the law, or to have acted pursuant to an unconstitutional
law which permits, but does not require, their conduct. Here, as the
district court found, the private defendants reasonably thought that
their contract with a government body requiredthem to act in a certain
manner. The private parties' contract with LANL required Mason &
Hanger to provide security forces for the laboratory, and to do so in
accordance with DOE regulations, including IMD 6102.
The type of case before us presents the strongest arguments for
extending qualified immunity to private party defendants. First, the
governmental authority involved requires private defendants to act as
they do. Indeed, were they to act otherwise they would likely be liable
for breach of contract to the governmental body with whom they
contracted. Not to allow immunity here places defendants between
Scylla and Charybdis-potentially liable either to plaintiffs
for
70
obeying the contract, or to governmental bodies for breaching it.
Although the Supreme Court's rejection of private party immunity

in Wyatt v. Cole71 has cast some doubt over the doctrine, the narrowness
of the holding in that case has allowed at least some circuits to continue

to recognize private party immunity where a defendant was compelled to
perform the acts that form the basis of the plaintiff's claim. For example,
in Sherman v. Four County Counseling Center,72 the court concluded
that "Wyatt does not bar, and public policy requires qualified immunity
be extended to [the defendant]" where the defendant was following a

65.

844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988).

66. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing a cause of action based on the deprivation of federal
rights under the color of state law).
67. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(allowing a cause of action against federal officials for the violation of constitutional rights).
68. DeVargas, 844 F.2d at 715-16.
69. Id. at 721-22.
70. Id. (footnote omitted).
71. 504 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1992).
72. 987 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1993).
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court order or statutory command.7 3 Distinguishing other situations, the
court stated:
Like the First Circuit, we distinguish this case from those in which
private parties "voluntarily engaged in illegal activities in the
advancement of their own self-interest." We refuse to give private
hospitals the Hobson's choice of obeying a court's order directing
discretionary medical treatment, and facing liability for the resulting
medical judgment, or refusing to make a medical judgment, and
exposing hospital staff and patients
to the risk of harm posed by a
74
potentially violent mental patient.

Along the same lines, in Eagon v. City of Elk City,75 the Tenth
Circuit, following post- Wyatt cases in the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits,
declared the rule "'that a private individual who performs a government
function pursuant to a state order or request is entitled to qualified
immunity if a state official would have 76
been entitled to such immunity
had he performed the function himself. ,
B. Application to ProductsLiability Cases
1. Definition of "Defect"
Although somewhat beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth
noting that the intuition that one should not be held liable in the absence
of choice 77 has assumed a place at the very core of modem products

73. Id. at 405.
74. Id. at 406 (quoting Felix de Santana v. Velez, 956 F.2d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1992)); see also
Rodriques v. Furtado, 950 F.2d 805, 815 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that a physician sued for
performing a cavity search was entitled to qualified immunity where he was "pressed into service by
the State").
For those who like to keep their clichdd metaphorical allusions straight, the court was
wrong to characterize this as a "Hobson's choice." See People v. Roberts, No. E039408, 2007 WL
2626371, at *11 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2007) ("Technically, 'Hobson's choice' means no
choice at all-'the option of taking the one thing offered or nothing.' What Roberts really means is
that he was between Scylla and Charybdis, a rock and a hard place, or the devil and the deep blue
sea." (quotation omitted)); see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
75. 72 F.3d 1480 (10th Cir. 1996).
76. Id. at 1489 (quoting Warner v. Grand County, 57 F.3d 962, 967 (10th Cir. 1995)).
77.

This intuition also finds support in the attribution literature. See, e.g., Daniel McGillis,

Attribution and the Law: Convergences Between Legal and Psychological Concepts, 2 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 289, 294 (1978) (noting that an earlier study found that "people typically assess an
action of another in light of potential alternative actions" (citing Edward E. Jones & Keith E. Davis,
From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process in Person Perception, in 2 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 219, 222-23 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965))).
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liability doctrine. Section 2 of the Products Liability Restatement
provides:
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it
contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective
because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from
its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in
the preparation and marketing of the product;
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed
by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption
of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor,
or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the
omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions
or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of 7the
8
instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
Although manufacturing defects exist simply because the product
fails to meet the manufacturer's own specifications, 79 the existence of
both design defects and warning defects is made to turn on whether the
manufacturer could have acted in a way other than it actually did.8 °
Thus, design defects exist only when there was "a reasonable alternative
design, ' 8 1 and warning defects exist when there was an unreasonable
failure to warn or instruct or when better warnings or instructions should
have been provided. 2 As the comments note, "manufacturers may
persuasively ask to be judged by a normative behavior standard
to which
83
conform.,
to
manufacturers
for
possible
it is reasonably
2. The Government Contractor "Defense"
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp.,84 the treatment of those manufacturers that created
products under a contract with the federal government was unsettled.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2, at 14 (1998).

Id cmt. c, at 18.
Id. cmt. a, at 15-16.
Id. § 2(b), at 14.
Id. § 2(c), at 14.
Id. cmt. a, at 17.
487 U.S. 500 (1988).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:157

The issue had been considered by no fewer than six circuit courts of
appeals 85 and many more federal district and state courts. 86 Although
private party immunity was usually found to exist, 87 significant
disagreement existed as to the proper basis of the immunity and its
proper scope. Probably a majority of cases took the position that the
contractor was immune from liability only when the plaintiff was injured
while on active duty in the military-that is, in those cases where the
government was immune under the Feres-Stenceldoctrine. 88
In any case, many courts agreed that there was a sound basis for
immunizing a government contractor under certain circumstances. For
example, in Johnston v. United States,89 the court explained:
[T]he government contract defense... applies only where the product
in question has been manufactured pursuant to a contract with the
government. This defense has been characterized as one that "allows
the contractor to 'share' the government's immunity from suit on
grounds of public policy," and is potentially applicable in a wide
variety of tort actions. Like the contract specification defense, the
government contract defense only applies where 90the injury-causing
aspect of the product was mandated by the contract.
... [One] rationale for the government contract defense is that it

would be inequitable to impose liability on a contractor for a defect in

85. See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 407-09 (4th Cir. 1986); Shaw v. Grumman
Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746(1lth Cir. 1985); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 566 (5th
Cit. 1985); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim F.R.G. on Sept. 11, 1982, 769 F.2d 115, 122-23
(3d Cir. 1985); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 596-97 (7th Cir. 1985); McKay v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983).
86. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 849 (E.D.N.Y. 1984);
In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142, 1151-52 (N.D. Cal. 1982); McLaughlin v.
Sikorsky Aircraft, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764, 768 (Ct. App. 1983); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 364 A.2d 43,
47 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 381 A.2d 805, 806 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977);
Casabianca v. Casabianca, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400,402 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
87. But see Nobriga v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 683 P.2d 389, 392 (Haw. 1984) (rejecting
immunity in cases involving asbestos).
88. Under Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950), the federal government is
immune from tort liability when the plaintiffwas on active duty in the military and the injury arose
out of an incident relating to that active duty. See, e.g., Tozer, 792 F.2d at 408-09; McKay, 704 F.2d
at 451. Moreover, under Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673-74
(1977), defendants who are held liable to persons who could not sue the government under Feres
are precluded from bringing indemnity claims against the government.
89. 568 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1983).
90. Id. at 356 (citations omitted). The "contract specification defense" is based on the premise
that it is not negligent for a contractor to follow plans prepared by another unless the contractor
knows or has reason to know of the excessive danger created by the plans. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 289(b), at 4 1, § 389 cmt. e, illus. 1, at 313, § 404 cmt. a, at 364-65 (1965).
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a product he was forced by the government to make. As the Agent
Orange court put it:
Where, as here, manufacturers claim to have been compelled by
federal law to produce a weapon of war without ability to
negotiate specifications, contract price or terms, the potential for
unfairly imposing liability becomes great. Without the government
contract defense a manufacturer capable of producing military
goods for government use would face the untenable position of
choosing between severe penalties for failing to supply products
necessary to conduct a war, and producing what the government
requires but at a contract price that makes no provision for the
need to insure against
9 1 potential liability for design flaws in the
government's plans.
There is no doubt that this spectre of inequity is a powerful
justification for the government contract defense, although it is not a
completely sufficient rationale: in some situations the manufacturer
might know that a design was dangerous and defective when the
government did not, and it would not be sound policy to allow the
manufacturer to nevertheless produce with impunity, without
at least
92
requiring him to share his knowledge with the government.
The facts giving rise to Boyle are fairly illustrative of the issues
presented. Boyle, a Marine helicopter pilot, was killed when his
helicopter, manufactured by the defendant, crashed into the ocean.93
Although he survived the initial crash, because the door opened out
(rather than in), the water pressure prevented him from opening the door
and escaping, thus resulting in his death by drowning. 94 His father
brought suit, alleging that the helicopter was defective by reason of its
design. 95 Suit could not be successfully brought against the federal
government since, among other reasons, Boyle was a member of the
armed forces who was injured in an incident arising out of that service
and was thus barred by Feres.96 The issue before the Court was whether
the defendant, as the party who manufactured the product under contract

91. Id. at 357 (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 794
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (citations omitted)).
92. Id. at 357-58 (citations omitted).
93. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 502 (1988).
94. Id. at 502-03.
95. Id.
96. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
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with the federal
government, could share in the government's sovereign
97
immunity.

In a five-to-four decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court held
that it could, provided certain conditions were satisfied:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed,
pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those
specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the
dangers in the use of the equipment
that were known to the supplier
98
but not to the United States.
In reaching that conclusion, the Court reasoned that "the
procurement of equipment by the United States is an area of uniquely
federal interest, ' 99 and, therefore, a proper subject for an expansion of
federal common law. l00 However, merely identifying it as such "does
not.., end the inquiry.... Displacement [of state law] will occur only
where... a 'significant conflict' exists between an identifiable 'federal
policy or interest and the [operation] of state law,' or the application of
state law would 'frustrate specific objectives' of federal legislation."' 0 1
Although the lower court reached its decision essentially by
expanding the Feres doctrine to encompass suits against contractors as
well, 10 2 in Boyle the conflict that the Court identified was that between
the imposition of state common-law liability on those who contract with
the government and the discretionary act immunity available to the
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), specifically,
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 10 3 That section provides that an action cannot be
brought against the government based "upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or employee
of the
10 4
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
The Court reasoned:
There is... a statutory provision that demonstrates the potential for,
and suggests the outlines of, "significant conflict" between federal
interests and state law in the context of Government procurement. In
97. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 503-04.
98. Id. at 512.
99. Id. at 507.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 509-10.
Id. at 510-11.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).
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the FTCA, Congress authorized damages to be recovered against the
United States for harm caused by the negligent or wrongful conduct of
Government employees, to the extent that a private person would be
liable under the law of the place where the conduct occurred. It
excepted from this consent to suit, however, [suit based upon
discretionary acts of government under § 2680(a)].

... And we are further of the view that permitting "secondguessing" of these judgments through state tort suits against
contractors would produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the
FTCA exemption. The financial burden of judgments against the
contractors would ultimately be passed through, substantially if not
totally, to the United States itself, since defense contractors will
predictably raise their prices to cover, or to insure against, contingent
liability for the Government-ordered designs. To put the point
differently: It makes little sense to insulate the Government against
financial liability for the judgment that a particular feature of military
equipment is necessary when the Government produces the equipment
itself, but not when it contracts for the production. In sum, we are of
the view that state law which holds Government contractors liable for
design defects in military equipment does in some circumstances
present a 0 "significant
conflict" with federal policy and must be
5
displaced.
Apart from the policy considerations emphasized by the Court,
however, there is another factor that the Court could have stressed, and
probably should have. Once the contractor has fully disclosed all known
risks, the final design decision is the government's. Even if the engineers
employed by United Technologies thought that outward opening doors
were the product of an incredibly foolish design decision, ultimately
there was little real choice involved. Assuming the government could
not be persuaded to alter the design, the company's only alternative
courses of action were to build it as the government wanted, or walk
away from the project, possibly incurring liability for breach. And the
latter course, while noble, is hardly a realistic option for a company
dependent on military contracts.
In short, it would simply have been unfair to assign blame to the
contractor under the circumstances presented by the case, and, as noted
above, the fairness rationale had been squarely addressed by some of the

105. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12 (citations and footnote omitted).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:157

lower courts that had previously considered the issue. 10 6 In turn, the
fairness claim is linked to the defendant's freedom of choice and thus it
was common for courts to at least consider the element of compulsion,
which clearly permeates much of the reasoning. One court observed that
"the government contract defense has been most successfully asserted by
government contractors who were required to produce products in
compliance with military specifications," 10 7 citing, among others, a New
Jersey case that held that liability could not be imposed on a vehicle
manufacturer based on a lack of seat belts or a roll bar where the vehicle
was manufactured for the military under specifications that did not
permit the installation of these safety features. 10 8
3. Two Narrow Exceptions
If, as argued here, it is the defendant's lack of choice that compels
the finding of implied immunity, that same principle causes one to
consider the possibility of circumstances under which immunity should
not be available. As previously noted in passing, defendants who are
subjected to coercion in a sense still have something of a choice to make,
even if the theoretical options are all bad ones.10 9 Being eaten by Scylla
is not much of an option, but there is still some element of choice
involved. In determining how bad a particular choice may be, one must
consider the various foreseen and foreseeable consequences that will
follow. Thus, it was observed earlier that it is unrealistic to ask a military
contractor, for example, to walk away from a contract simply because of
disagreement over the wisdom of some aspect of the design upon which
the government is insistent.110
Nevertheless, it is at least possible that some design or warning
options are, to use the language of the ProductsLiabilityRestatement, so
"manifestly unreasonable" that a defendant should be held responsible
for simply agreeing to market a product that includes a particular design
feature or, perhaps, for marketing the product at all. 11

106. See supra note 92 and accompanying text; see also Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556,
566 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 794
(E.D.N.Y. 1980)).
107. In re All Maine Asbestos Litig., 575 F. Supp. 1375, 1377-78 (D. Me. 1983) (citing
numerous cases as examples).
108. Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 364 A.2d 43, 45-47 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976), affd, 381
A.2d 805 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
109. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
110. See supra text accompanying note 106-08.
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e, at 21-22 (1998).
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To illustrate, the comments to the Products Liability Restatement
use the example of an exploding cigar capable of generating sufficient
force to cause personal injury to the victim of a practical joke as a case
where liability for defective design might be found, notwithstanding the
lack of a reasonable alternative design. 1 2 Along the same lines, one can
imagine a medical device or pharmaceutical that is simply too dangerous
to market, notwithstanding the existence of a mandate issued by the
Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") (assuming FDA approval is, in
1 13
"mandate").'
a
fact,
Consider, for example, the following illustration from the Products
Liability Restatement:
1. ABC Pharmaceuticals manufactures and distributes D, a prescription
drug intended to prolong pregnancy and thus to reduce the risks
associated with premature birth. Patricia, six months pregnant with a
history of irregular heart beats, was given D during a hospital stay in
connection with her pregnancy. As a result, she suffered heart failure
and required open-heart surgery. In Patricia's action against ABC, her
expert testifies that, notwithstanding FDA approval of D five years
prior to Patricia's taking the drug, credible studies published two years
prior to Patricia's taking the drug concluded that D does not prolong
pregnancy for any class of patients. Notwithstanding a finding by the
trier of fact that ABC gave adequate warnings to the prescribing
physician regarding the serious risks of heart failure in patients with a
history of irregular heart beats, the trier of fact can find that reasonably
informed health-care providers would not prescribe D for any class of
patients, thus rendering ABC subject to liability."'
The foregoing illustration hints at a second exception to the
immunity suggested here. Product manufacturers frequently are actively

112.
113.
114.

Id. cmt. e, illus. 5, at 22.
See infra text accompanying notes 173-77,180-81.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. f, illus. 1, at 150 (1998). The

illustration was apparently based on Tobin v. Astra PharmaceuticalProducts, Inc., 993 F.2d 528,
540 (6th Cir. 1993). See also George W. Conk, The True Test: Alternative Safer Designsfor Drugs
and Medical Devices in a Patent-ConstrainedMarket, 49 UCLA L. REv. 737, 743 (2001)
(criticizing the Restatement approach to the problem and noting that the drug in question "is
manifestly unreasonable in design even in the absence of an alternative design"); Michael D. Green,
PrescriptionDrugs, Alternative Designs, and the Restatement (Third): PreliminaryReflections, 30

SETON HALL L. REv. 207, 227 (1999) (discussing the possibility of "categorical liability" for drugs,
which would entail "a determination of defectiveness is permitted based on the inherent risks that a
prodiuct poses without proof of any alternative design. Such liability might be based on a judgment
that a product's risks outweigh its benefits, and, therefore, the manufacturer should not be marketing
the product because it is too dangerous, or, at a minimum, all harms caused by the product should be
imposed on the manufacturer").
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involved in the process of producing legislation and regulations that
affect their various industries. Sometimes the process by which the
industry provides information is quite transparent. Sometimes, however,
it is, shall we say, something less than that. Moreover, at various times,
as well as in various contexts, it has been claimed that a variety of
industries have sought to intentionally mislead federal regulators by
affirmatively misrepresenting or concealing facts, or by failing to
disclose.
For roughly ten years spanning 1990 to 2000, a number of lawsuits
were filed against products manufacturers in which it was claimed that
they had defrauded regulatory agencies into approving the proposed
115
design of products and/or the warnings that were to accompany them.
In 2001, however, in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee,116 a
case involving allegations of "fraud-on-the-FDA" in obtaining FDA
approval of a particular type of orthopedic bone screw, the Court held
that:
[T]he plaintiffs' state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims conflict with, and
are therefore impliedly pre-empted by, federal law. The conflict stems
from the fact that the federal statutory scheme amply empowers the
FDA to punish and deter fraud against the Administration, and that this
authority is used by the Administration to achieve a somewhat delicate
balance of statutory objectives. The balance sought by the
Administration can 1be
skewed by allowing fraud-on-the-FDA claims
17
under state tort law.

A concurring opinion written by Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Thomas, disagreed with the majority's preemption analysis, but noted
the difficulties in proving that the fraud caused the harm complained of

115. See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817, 820 (3d Cir.
1998), rev'd sub noma.Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Michael v.
Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1334 (3d Cir. 1995); Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc., 24 F.3d 125, 132 (10th Cir. 1994); Learjet Corp. v. Spenlinhauer, 901 F.2d
198, 200-01 (1st Cir. 1990); Lawson v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., No. 4:96CV0297, 1999
WL 1129677, at *7 (N.D. Ga. 1999); Hawkins v. Upjohn Co., 890 F. Supp. 609, 611-12 (E.D. Tex.
1994).
116. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
117. Id. at 348 (footnote omitted); see also Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The Normalization of
Product Preemption Doctrine, 57 ALA. L. REv. 725, 753 (2006) ("In Buckman, the important role
of state tort law in product cases was overshadowed by the overriding federal interests reflected in

the federal enforcement scheme. Chief Justice Rehnquist was concerned that allowing the state
fraud claims would interfere with the federal interest of allowing a federal agency to police its own
process, particularly where the duties underlying the common law remedies directly involved the
relationship of the manufacturer to the federal agency." (footnote omitted)).
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in light of the fact that even after the truth came
to light, the FDA did not
18
act to remove the product from the market.'
Fraud, however, may play a different role than that asserted by the
plaintiff and addressed by the Court. If, as I will explain, the
manufacturers' exculpation should be based not on the fiction of
congressional intent, but on the unfairness that would result to a product
manufacturer when the conduct which is alleged to be tortious is, in fact,
mandated by law, 119 the defendant's immunity from liability should be
forfeited where it can be shown that it wrongfully participated in the
crafting of the very mandate it now seeks to use as a shield.
V.

RECONSIDERING THE "PREEMPTION DECISIONS"

A.

SharedSovereign Immunity

Many of the federal preemption cases involve factual situations
that, in some sense, can be viewed as arising out of tortious misconduct
by the federal government. Consider again, for example, the case
underlying the suit in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.120 In that case, the
defendants' claim of federal preemption was based on the Act, 121 which
prohibited the sale of cigarettes unless the package contained the
following language: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to
Your Health."' 122 In 1969, the Act was amended to strengthen the "may
be hazardous" language to "Is Dangerous. ,23 The plaintiff's lawsuit was
based in part on a failure to warn theory, claiming that the federally
mandated warning on the cigarette packages was inadequate. 124 In other
words, although the defendants were private parties, in essence the
lawsuit was a claim that Congress was negligent in enacting legislation
that mandated an insufficiently strong warning.
Of course, suit could not be brought against Congress for passing a
bad law. Prior to the enactment of the FTCA 125 in 1946, such an action
could not be brought against the government unless the government

118. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353-55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 65-74, 91,105-08.
120. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39(1965).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (Supp. 11965).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1969) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1965)).
124. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 509 (plurality opinion).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000) (providing that the United States may be held liable "in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances").
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waived sovereign immunity. 26 The enactment of the FTCA partially
abrogated sovereign immunity, but not to the extent that would expose
the federal government to potential tort liability for enacting a bad law.
In Dalehite v. United States, 127 the Court, referring to the discretionary
act exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity, explained:
The legislative history indicates that while Congress desired to waive
the Government's immunity from actions for injuries to person and
property occasioned by the tortious conduct of its agents acting within
their scope of business, it was not contemplated that the government
should be subject to liability arising from acts of a govemmental nature
or function. Section 2680(a) draws this distinction.
Given that Congress was immune from liability for having
mandated the particular label warnings specified in the Act and in its
1969 amendment, the question was really whether the cigarette
manufacturers should have been permitted to share in the governmental
29
immunity when they complied with the governmental mandate.
In other words, there were in fact two very separate and distinct
bases for arguing that federal law displaces state law presented in
Cipollone, and the Court chose the wrong one. Based on the issues as
framed by the parties, of course, the Court focused on the preemption
language of the Act and its 1969 amendment, which, in fact, probably
30
evidenced no congressional intent to bar state common-law lawsuits.1
On the other hand, the Court could have focused on the conflict between
the discretionary acts immunity of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), which served to
immunize Congress from liability for passing a bad law, 13 1 and the state
law that potentially served to impose liability on those who were
compelled to comply with that law. As in Boyle, it is this conflict that
provided the basis for extending sovereign immunity to the defendants
because the important federal interest in having congressional mandates
obeyed would be undercut by the imposition of state civil liability on
those who must comply. Under a legal system that views the imposition
of tort liability as a sanction for wrongdoing, any other result would be
viewed as grossly unfair.

126. The history and private bill process utilized prior to the enactment of the FTCA is
discussed in Dalehite v, United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-28 (1953).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 27-28 (footnotes omitted).
129. See Cipollone,505 U.S. at 510-12.
130. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000).
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Of course, the extent to which the labeling requirements at issue in
Cipollone limited the defendants' choices makes the case particularly
clear. Nevertheless, the extent of choice that could have been exercised
by the defendants in light of the particular legislative or regulatory
command, though not explicitly articulated in those terms, often appears
to be the deciding principle, not only in Cipollone, but in most of the
products liability preemption cases.
B.

The Post-CipollonePreemptionDecisions

With one notable exception, the Court has found preemption in
those cases in which the product manufacturer was compelled by a
specific legislative or regulatory command to act in the manner which
subsequently is alleged to have been tortious, but has declined to do so
in those cases where the federal legislation or regulation would have
permitted the manufacturer to have done more.
For example, in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 132 in finding preemption
under the Medical Device Amendment ("MDA") to the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 133 the majority specifically noted that "[o]nce a device has
received premarket approval ["PMA"], the MDA forbids the
manufacturer to make, without FDA permission, changes in design
specifications, manufacturing processes, labeling, or any other attribute,
that would affect safety or effectiveness."' 34 In other words, although the
device manufacturer obviously participated in the PMA process, once
the agency acted by granting approval, it is at least arguable that the
defendant had no choice but to manufacture and label the product as
approved. However, it is important to note that the factual question of
whether FDA approval constitutes a mandate compelling compliance has
emerged as a critical and hotly contested issue in those cases where a
drug is alleged to be defective by reason of its design or the warnings
that accompany it. 135
On the other hand, Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC 136 was a case
that involved a claim of preemption under § 136v(b) of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA").13 7 That section
provided: "Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any
132. 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
133. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as 21
U.S.C. §§ 360c etseq. (2000)).
134. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1005.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 174-78 and 181-82.
136. 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
36
36
137. Id. at 434; see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 1 -1 y (2006).
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requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from
those required under this subchapter., 138 In the course of refusing to find
preemption, the Court explicitly stressed that FIFRA did not constrain
the defendant's freedom of action.139 Although the case was remanded to
allow a lower court to determine whether a failure to warn claim was
being asserted,1 40 at least as to "breach of express warranty, fraud,
violation of the Texas DTPA [Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
Protection Act], strict liability (including defective design and defective
manufacture), and negligent testing,"' 14 1 the Court noted:
Rules that require manufacturers to design reasonably safe products, to
use due care in conducting appropriate testing of their products, to
market products free of manufacturing defects, and to honor their
express warranties or other contractual commitments plainly do not
qualify as requirements for "labeling or packaging." None of these
common-law rules requires that manufacturers label or package their
products in any particular way. Thus, petitioners' claims for defective
design, defective manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of express
warranty are not pre-empted.
To be sure, Dow's express warranty was located on Strongarm's
label. But a cause of action on an express warranty asks only that a
manufacturer make good on the contractual commitment that it
voluntarily undertook by placing that warranty on its product. Because
this common-law rule does not require the manufacturer to make an
express warranty, or in the event that the manufacturer elects to do so,
to say anything in particular in that warranty,
the rule does not impose
42
a requirement "for labeling or packaging."
Although in both Riegel and Bates the Court conducted an
extensive analysis of the preemption language in the MDA and
FIFRA 143 in reaching its respective decisions, those analyses,
particularly concerning the MDA, 144 are not only open to serious
138. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b).
139. See Bates, 544 U.S. at 445 ("A requirement is a rule of law that must be obeyed; an event,
such as a jury verdict, that merely motivates an optional decision is not a requirement.").
140. Id. at 442 n.15.
141. Id.
142. Id.at 444-45 (citation and footnotes omitted).
143. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 999, 1003 (2008); Bates, 544 U.S. at 441-42.
144. See, e.g., Riegel, 128 S.Ct. at 1014-15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting):

Congress enacted the MDA "to provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical
devices intended for human use." A series of high-profile medical device failures that
caused extensive injuries and loss of life propelled adoption of the MDA. Conspicuous
among these failures was the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, used by approximately
2.2 million women in the United States between 1970 and 1974. Aggressively promoted
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question but, more importantly, unnecessary to the decision of those
cases. As in Cipollone, the real issue was shared sovereign immunity
and, under that approach, only if the defendant was truly faced with the
options of marketing the product as approved or withdrawing it from the
market altogether would shared sovereign immunity be appropriate.
C. Geier
The only Supreme Court case that is neither justifiable under any
traditional preemption doctrine, nor explicable by reference to the shared
sovereign immunity or fairness based on freedom of choice principles, is
45
Co.,
the Court's 2000 decision in Geier v. American Honda Motor

and, in the final analysis, the decision in that case is difficult to defend.
As noted earlier, courts have held that preemption may either be
express or implied.1 46 Express preemption may be found when the
legislative intent to preempt is "explicitly stated in the statute's language
or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose."' 47 Implied
preemption, on the other hand, may take one of two forms. So-called
"field preemption" may be found "if federal law so thoroughly occupies
a legislative field 'as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
may
no room for the States to supplement it.""' 148 Alternatively, state law
49

be preempted in cases of a conflict between state and federal law.1
Underlying the notion of implied conflict preemption is the
assertion, often implicit, that Congress intended, in some rather
undefined way, to preclude the possibility of inconsistencies between
federal law and policy, on the one hand, and state law and policy, on the
other. 150 However, the inference of such congressional intent is often
as a safe and effective form of birth control, the Dalkon Shield had been linked to 16
deaths and 25 miscarriages by the middle of 1975. By early 1976, "more than 500
lawsuits seeking compensatory and punitive damages totaling more than $400 million"
had been filed. Given the publicity attending the Dalkon Shield litigation and Congress'
awareness of the suits at the time the MDA was under consideration, I find informative
the absence of any sign of a legislative design to preempt state common-law tort actions.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted); see also Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and
Medical Devices: The Courts Run Amok, 59 MO. L. REv. 895, 930 (1994) (arguing that
congressional silence regarding any intent to preempt state tort litigation is evidence that
preemption was not intended).
145. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
146. See supranote 30.

147.
148.
Fid. Fed.
149.
150.

Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
Id. at 516.
See Geier for an explanation:
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pure fiction, not only unsupported by any objective basis for believing it
to be true, but sometimes directly contradicted by the available evidence.
That was the situation in Geier.
Eight years earlier, in Cipollone, the Court had claimed that the
presence of an express preemption provision "provides a 'reliable
indicium of congressional intent"" 5' and thus "'there is no need to infer
congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive
provisions' of the legislation."1 52 Nevertheless, although the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("NTMVSA") contained a
provision that rather clearly asserted that compliance with safety
standards promulgated pursuant to the NTMVSA was not to "exempt
any person from any liability under common law,"'153 the Geier Court
engaged in a lengthy and often
convoluted analysis in order to find
154
implied (conflict) preemption.
At issue was a federal regulation promulgated by the Department of
Transportation ("DOT") dealing with passive restraint systems for
automobiles. The regulation, the 1984 version of Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard ("FMVSS") 208, gave manufacturers a number of
choices. As the Court explained:
[T]hat standard deliberately sought variety-a mix of several different
passive restraint systems. It did so by setting a performance
requirement for passive restraint devices and allowing manufacturers
to choose among different passive restraint mechanisms, such as
airbags, automatic belts, or other passive restraint technologies to
satisfy that requirement. And DOT explained why FMVSS 208 sought
the mix of devices that it expected its performance standard to
produce. DOT wrote that it had rejected a proposed FMVSS 208 "all
airbag" standard because of safety concerns (perceived or real)
associated with airbags, which concerns threatened a "backlash" more
This policy [of uniform standards] by itself favors pre-emption of state tort suits, for the
rules of law that judges and juries create or apply in such suits may themselves similarly
create uncertainty and even conflict, say, when different juries in different States reach
different decisions on similar facts.
On the other hand, the saving clause reflects a congressional determination that
occasional nonuniformity is a small price to pay for a system in which juries not only
create, but also enforce, safety standards, while simultaneously providing necessary
compensation to victims. That policy by itself disfavors pre-emption, at least some of the
time.
Id.at 871.
151. 505 U.S. at 517 (plurality opinion) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497,
505 (1978)).
152. Id. (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987)).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988) (repealed 1994).
154. Geier,529 U.S. at 868-74.
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easily overcome "if airbags" were "not the only way of complying." It
added that a mix of devices would help develop data on comparative
effectiveness, would allow the industry time to overcome the safety
problems and the high production costs associated with airbags, and
would facilitate the development
of alternative, cheaper, and safer
55
passive restraint systems. 1

Mr. Geier was injured in an accident involving a 1987 Honda
Accord. 156 The vehicle was equipped with lap and shoulder belts, which
were being utilized at the time of the crash.' 57 The vehicle was lacking
airbags, and the theories of liability under state law in the suit that
ensued were that the vehicle was defective because it lacked airbags and
58
Honda was negligent for not equipping the vehicle with airbags.
Reasoning that "no airbag" lawsuits could not be reconciled with a
federal regulation that expressly endorsed the use of passive restraint
systems other than airbags, Justice Breyer, writing
for the majority,
59
preempted.
was
lawsuit
state
the
that
concluded
As a matter of policy, of course, the majority's position is certainly
understandable, as is that of many tort reform advocates who have
argued for the enactment of state legislation establishing a statutory
compliance defense in products liability cases generally.16 However, the
claim that this was what Congress intended when the NTMVSA was
enacted stands unsupported since the law itself clearly states
otherwise, 161 and, in fact, as the dissent in Geier complained, the use of
155. Id. at 878-79 (internal citations omitted).
156. Id. at 865.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 874.
160. See generally Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the
Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461 (1997) (discussing the pros and cons of establishing
a statutory compliance defense for pharmaceutical products liability litigation).
161. See Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption That Never Was: Pre-emption
Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARiz. L. REv. 1379, 1448 (1998).
The final Senate report is significant in its explanation of the Safety Act's meaning
and its effect on state law. The report first recognized the need for uniformity throughout
the country because of the mass production and high volume nature of automobile
manufacturing and then noted that state standards are pre-empted only if they differ from
the applicable federal standard. More importantly, though, the report proceeded to
qualify the pre-emption. It stated: "[m]oreover, the Federal minimum safety standards
need not be interpreted as restricting State common-law standards of care. Compliance
with such standards would thus not necessarily shield any person from product liability
at common law." The intent of Congress, as seen in this passage, was to achieve
regulatory uniformity as a subsidiary objective; once a minimum level of safety was
established under the federal scheme, the states were free to impose liability on a
manufacturer for defective products that caused injuries.
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fictionalized congressional intent gives "unelected federal judges carte
blanche to use federal 162
law as a means of imposing their own ideas of tort
reform on the States."'
Nevertheless, it is clear that the existence of some types of conflict
between federal law and state tort liability should provide the basis for a
defense. The basis for such a defense, however, arises out of fairness
considerations, quite apart from any question of congressional intent. In
this regard, it is necessary to distinguish two very different forms of
conflict that may arise between state and federal law and policy. The
first type of conflict between state and federal law involves the situation
where the defendant literally cannot comply with both. Thus, the Court
had previously noted: "[W]e must ask whether or not the Federal and
State Statutes are in 'irreconcilable conflict.' [This would be the case,]
for example, if the federal law said, 'you must sell insurance,' while the
state law said, 'you may not.' ' 163 The second situation in which conflicts
are said to arise exists when "state law 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
64
,,1
Congress.
The former represents a clear illustration of the Scylla-Charybdis
dilemma, the existence of which has been found, in analogous cases, to

Also important is the Safety Act's implicit distinction between state statutes or
regulations, forms of direct regulation promulgated by state machinery, and commonlaw damage actions; in the Senate report passage, Congress discussed the two types of
regulation and the pre-emption of only one of them, state "standards." The evidence
from legislative history confirms what appears to be the plain language of the statute.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Study in JudicialSleight of Hand: Did
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Eradicate the Presumption Against Preemption?, 17 BYU J.
PuB. L. 1, 3 (2002) ("The Geier Court, although further muddling long-standing preemption
doctrine, seemed nonetheless determined to make it much easier for judicial preemption to trump
even clear congressional enactments that explicitly save state law from federal law override.").
162. Geier, 529 U.S. at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996).
164. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). It is important to note, however, that in
Geier, the Court explicitly refused to make a distinction between "impossibility" and "obstacle"
conflict preemption. The Court stated:
The Court has not previously driven a legal wedge-only a terminological onebetween "conflicts" that prevent or frustrate the accomplishment of a federal objective
and "conflicts" that make it "impossible" for private parties to comply with both state
and federal law. Rather, it has said that both forms of conflicting state law are "nullified"
by the Supremacy Clause, and it has assumed that Congress would not want either kind
of conflict. The Court has thus refused to read general "saving" provisions to tolerate
actual conflict both in cases involving impossibility and in "frustration-of-purpose"
cases.
Geier, 529 U.S. at 873-74 (citations omitted).
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be an adequate basis for immunizing a defendant from liability.' 65 The
latter, however, does not, for the simple reason that a defendant is not
deprived of choice; that is, the defendant is not compelled to act in a way
that subsequently forms the basis for civil liability. It may well be true,
of course, that inconsistency between federal policy goals and state tort
liability may be the product of foolish lawmaking or the enactment of
inconsistent legislative policy choices, but this, by itself, does not justify
judicial intervention on the basis of either congressional intent or
fairness. This was the situation presented in Geier. Neither the
NTMVSA nor the regulation promulgated by DOT under its delegated
rule-making authority can be said to have compelled Honda to choose
the design at issue-that is, some restraint system other than airbags. In
the absence of compulsion, the fairness justification advanced
here for
66
1
defended.
be
cannot
immunity
sovereign
shared
finding
Moreover, there is an additional reason that a claim of shared
sovereign immunity is untenable in the context of Geier. While it is true,
of course, that the promulgation of FMVSS 208 could not expose the
DOT to state tort liability given the discretionary acts immunity
provision of § 2680(a), any inference that a private party should be
entitled to share in that immunity is rebutted by the terms of the savings
clause that expressly permitted state tort law suits against private
parties. 167 While the claim of shared immunity was available, even
compelling, in cases like Boyle or Cipollone, it is utterly inconsistent
with the respective roles of the judiciary and legislative branches for the
Court to imply such a doctrine in the face of an express congressional
declaration that it is not to exist. Thus, in effect, the savings clause
becomes a congressional statement that immunity is not to be shared.
D. FDA Approval
In a series of recent state and federal cases, courts have struggled
with the question of whether drug manufacturers should be protected
from tort liability in cases where a particular drug, whose design and

165.
166.

See supra text accompanying notes 65-76, 89-108.
Unless one wishes to openly acknowledge the Court to be a political policy-making

institution, a view that creates all kinds of legitimacy issues concerning an unelected judiciary's role
in a system committed to majoritarian politics. Although the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" is
beyond the scope of this Article, it has been the subject of numerous scholarly articles and books.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF

POLITICS 16 (1962) (coining the phrase "counter-majoritarian difficulty"); see also Symposium, The
Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 845 (2001).

167. See supra text accompanying notes 99-105.
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label had been approved by the FDA, is alleged to have been defective
by reason of design or, more commonly, inadequate warning. 68 As one
would expect, the decisions ostensibly seek to interpret and apply (or
distinguish) the Geier decision. What is interesting, however, is that
once one looks beyond the analyses necessitated by Geier, it becomes
apparent that the decisions actually turn on the implied immunity
question discussed here.
Consider, for example, Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.,'169 a recent splitpanel decision out of the Third Circuit. The case arose out of the drug
companies' failure to warn of the alleged risk of suicide among adults
taking selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors ("SSRIs"). 170 While the
17 1
majority claimed to find preemption using a Geier-type of analysis,
the opinions of both the majority and dissent focused on whether the
defendant drug manufacturers could have done anything other than
manufacture the drug with the FDA-approved label (which did not warn
of a suicide risk for adult users). 172 The plaintiffs made two important
arguments:
First, they argue that nothing less than the FDA's explicit rejection of a
drug manufacturer's request to add a contested warning to its drug
labeling should suffice to establish conflict preemption. Second, they
contend that the pharmaceutical companies failed to provide the FDA
a valid decision regarding the
with sufficient information for it to7 make
3
necessity of a suicidality warning.1
In other words, the first claim was that the defendants were not
locked into the earlier FDA approval of the warning that did not mention
adult suicide. Under the FDA's procedures, the companies could have
tried to get the FDA to change the warning, but failed to do So., 74 In
response, writing for the majority, Judge Sloviter stressed that attempts
to get the FDA to change the warning would have been futile, noting
that "[t]he FDA clearly and publicly stated its position prior to the
168. See generally Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3rd Cir. 2008); Mason v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 618 (C.D. Ill. 2008); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 562 F.
Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Minn. 2008); Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharms. Co., 562 F. Supp. 2d 1091 (N.D. Cal.
2008); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 776 (E.D. La. 2007); McDarby v. Merck &
Co., 949 A.2d 223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008); Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006),
cert. granted, 128 S.Ct. 1118 (2008).
169. 521 F.3d 253 (2008).
170. Id. at 256.

171.
172.

Id.at 264-69, 274-75.
Id. at 268-76, 278-84.

173.

Id. at272.

174. Id. at 268.
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prescriptions and deaths at issue here." 175 In fact, the holding was
specifically limited to those cases "in which the FDA has publicly
rejected the need for a warning that plaintiffs argue state law
requires."' 176 Moreover, the majority opinion notes:
[The FDA] has repeatedly rejected the scientific basis for the warnings
that [the plaintiffs] argue should have been included in the labeling.
The FDA has actively monitored the possible association between
SSRIs and suicide for nearly twenty years, and has concluded that the
suicide warnings desired by plaintiffs are77without scientific basis and
would therefore be false and misleading.1
The dissent too focused on the question of whether the defendants
were powerless to change the command of the regulatory body, arguing,
in effect, that the defendants were free to ignore the FDA mandate
without any real risk of sanction. Judge Ambro wrote:
None of the drug manufacturers in these cases attempted to enhance
a warning and received an FDA sanction in response. The majority
opinion correctly states that hypothetical conflicts can give rise to
conflict preemption. But the hypothetical in question must be
convincing for us to allow this. The conflict the defendants raise relies,
at its heart, on the FDA punishing drug manufacturers for overwarning. But a heightened warning would likely have its source in new
information that the FDA had not previously known. Thus, I find it
hard to believe that, if a drug manufacturer augmented its warning in
response to or in anticipation of a state tort lawsuit, the FDA would
sanction the manufacturer for over-warning consumers under 21
U.S.C. §§ 331(a)-(b) and 352(a).
Indeed, drug manufacturers have authority to strengthen warnings
without advance permission from the FDA. The plain language of 21
C.F.R. § 314.70 permits unilateral additions to warnings, subject to
subsequent FDA approval: "[T]he holder of an approved application
may commence distribution of the drug product involved upon receipt
by the agency of a supplement for the change," including such changes
as "add[ing] or strengthen[ing] a contraindication, warning, precaution,
or adverse reaction.
The plaintiffs' second important argument urges the court to find an
exception from what is, in essence, a grant of immunity, based on the
175. ld.at271.

176. Id.
at 271-72.
177. Id. at 269 (footnote omitted).
178. Id. at 282 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.70(c)(6), (c)(6)(iii)(A) (2007)).
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defendants' alleged failure to disclose sufficient information to the FDA
regarding the risk of adult suicide. 179 As noted earlier, if the FDA
approval (or mandate) was based on the defendants' concealment or
non-disclosure of the relevant risk, the defendants ought not to be able to
80
share in the agency's tort immunity.'
Considering the same issue, the Vermont Supreme Court declined
to find "preemption" in Levine v. Wyeth.18' As in Colacicco, the decision
turned on the extent to which the defendant was obligated to use the
FDA-approved warning. The court asserted:
Section 314.70(c) creates a specific procedure allowing drug
manufacturers to change labels that are insufficient to protect
consumers, despite their approval by the FDA. "The FDA's approved
label ... can therefore be said to set the minimum labeling
requirement, and not necessarily the ultimate label where a
manufacturer improves the label to promote greater safety." While
specific federal labeling requirements and state common-law duties
might otherwise leave drug manufacturers with conflicting obligations,
§ 314.70(c) allows manufacturers to avoid state failure-to-warn claims
without violating federal law. ("[I]t is apparent that prior FDA
approval need not be obtained, nor will a product be deemed
mislabeled, if the manufacturer voluntarily or even unilaterally
strengthens the approved warnings, precautions or potential adverse
reactions upon the label pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A).").
There is thus no conflict between federal labeling requirements and
state failure-to-warn claims. Section 314.70(c) allows, and arguably
encourages, manufacturers to add and strengthen warnings that, despite
FDA approval, are insufficient to protect consumers. State tort claims
simply give these manufacturers
a concrete incentive to take this action
82
as quickly as possible.'
Since the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Levine,' 83 the
preemption question, if the cases actually present one, remains very
much up in the air. However, the outcome should be made to turn on the
extent to which pharmaceutical companies were compelled to
manufacture and label drugs in a manner that complies with previously

179. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
181. 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006), cert.granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008).
182. Id. at 185-86 (alteration in original) (quoting McNellis ex rel. DeAngelis v. Pfizer, Inc.,
No. 05-1286, 2005 WL 3752269, at *5, rev'd sub nom. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253,

276 (3d Cir. 2008)).
183. Oral argument was heard on Nov. 3, 2008. A transcript of the argument is available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argumenttranscripts/06-1249.pdf.
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granted FDA approval and how that approval came about, not whether
state tort liability is, for other reasons, a good idea.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has been remaking the "preemption doctrine"
in products liability cases for a few decades now. That the Court chose
to deal with these cases on the basis of fictional congressional intent can
only be regarded as unfortunate. It is unfortunate because it seems so
unlikely that anyone really believes that the will of Congress is driving
these decisions, and the Court seriously undermines its own credibility
when it gives the appearance of engaging in a charade--dictating tort
reform with a wink and a nod. It is all the more unfortunate since the
outcome of many of these cases is completely defensible under another
body of principles.
It is true, of course, that the shared sovereign immunity approach
suggested here carries a few problems of its own. At the very least, it
involves the expansion of federal common law, an idea that has been
disfavored at least since Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins. 184 Nevertheless,
in Boyle the Court plausibly identified military contracts as an area of
special federal concern and thus appropriate for federal common-law
development.' 85 Perhaps the Court's description of that field as "unique"
overstated the case. Certainly some lower federal courts have shown a
willingness to apply basic tort precepts to carve out immunities in
§ 1983 and Bivens cases and have done so in a carefully limited and
principled way. 86 The same is true in many of the pre-Boyle government
contract immunity cases.' 87 Maybe federal product liability regulation
has now emerged as an area ripe for some federal common-law
development as well.
If so, widely accepted understandings as to the circumstances under
which responsibility should be attributed and tort liability imposed
dictate the outlines of immunity from liability. If a defendant is
confronted with liability resulting from conduct which was compelled by
congressional mandate or regulatory command, fairness considerations
demand that the sovereign immunity available to the governmental
184.
185.

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
The Court noted that areas of "uniquely federal interests" had previously been limited to

the obligations of the United States under contract and the civil liability of federal officers. While
the liability of government contractors did not exactly fall into either category, it was sufficiently
related to both to permit the extension. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-05 (1988).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 65-76.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92, 106-08.
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entity also be made available to the private actor. In the absence of
compulsion, however, there is no reason that state tort law should not be
permitted to demand that individuals and entities accept responsibility
for having caused harm.
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